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Abstract
Despite substantial financial aid from international donors for procurement of health prod-
ucts, stockouts of life-saving drugs related to prevalent infectious diseases are still widespread
in Africa. Rigorous research to understand the underlying causes of these stockouts is lacking.
To this end, we study the relationship between The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria and its grant recipients. Specifically, we leverage historical fund disbursement and
drug procurement data from 2002 to 2013 to build a discrete-event simulation model predicting
the joint impact of procurement and grant disbursement processes on national drug availability
for the Global Fund’s recipient countries in Africa. This model is validated against cumulative
stockout levels inferred from historical grant implementation lengths, and used to evaluate po-
tential high-level modifications in the disbursement or procurement process. Results show the
existence of significant intrinsic stockout risks in most African countries, with particularly high
levels in East Africa, due to the unpredictability of fund disbursements and the frequency of
grant performance monitoring performed by the Global Fund. Interventions shifting some fund
disbursements upfront to protect against disbursement timing uncertainty are predicted to be
more effective than others that include regional buffer stocks and bridge financing.
Key words: Global Fund; access to medicines; performance-based funding; global health financing;
Africa
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1 Introduction
Twenty-five years ago, almost one-third of the world’s population did not have access to essential
medicines (Foster et al. 2006). Major trends in global health since then include the emergence of
new actors such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the
Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as
well as budget increases of bilateral donors such as the US and UK governments (Atun et al. 2012).
This has resulted in a significant increase of international funding for health programs in low-income
countries (currently US $27 billion a year, see IHME 2014). Unfortunately, communicable diseases
treatable in the developed world remain widespread: HIV/AIDS remains the leading cause of adult
death in Africa with an estimated 23 million people living with HIV at the end of 2011 and 2.5
million new infections per year (United Nations 2013); malaria and tuberculosis combined led to
over 2 million deaths in 2011, again mostly in Africa (WHO 2013a and 2013b).
Established in 2002, The Global Fund is currently the world’s largest external financier of HIV,
tuberculosis and malaria programs. Funded by countries such as the United States (29% of total paid
to October 2012), France (13%), the United Kingdom (9%) and Germany (7%); private foundations
such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (5%); and corporations such as Chevron (0.2%),
by October 2012 it had committed US $22.9 billion to prevention, treatment and care in 151 low
and medium-income countries. This includes US $9.2bn (around 40%) for procuring medicines and
health products, and US $9bn (around 38%) for strengthening health systems (Global Fund 2012a).
The Global Fund was the pioneer global health organization serving as a financier only without
a direct role in health program implementation. To raise money from its donors, the Global Fund
promotes its specific performance-based financing model: disbursements to grant recipients are
conditional on past grant performance, which involves fund usage transparency and achievement of
result targets predefined by the grant recipient (e.g., number of patients treated, number of doctors
trained, number of facilities opened, see Center for Global Development 2013). Although other
organizations such as GAVI and the World Bank have recently adopted performance-based funding
for some of their activities, the Global Fund constitutes the first and largest global implementation
of this innovative funding model to date. As a result, the Global Fund experience presents a unique
opportunity to identify lessons about performance-based funding that may be relevant to many
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other organizations.
Indeed, despite the positive impact of Global Fund-supported programs (Brugha et al. 2004),
stockouts of health products at health facility (peripheral) and national level (e.g. central ware-
house) have been widespread in countries receiving Global Fund financing, particularly in Africa
(Yu et al. 2008, PLoS Medicine Editors 2009, Oliynyk 2011): in a 2009 survey, 9 out of 14 sur-
veyed African countries reported stockout of at least one type of medicine related to Global Fund
grants within the last year, four reported stockouts of two or more types, and all reported at least
one near-stockout situation (Global Fund 2009). Stockouts cause treatment interruptions, loss of
confidence in health systems and providers, increased risks of drug resistance and adverse effects
on disease epidemiology. Consequently, stockouts lead to increased morbidity and mortality for a
large number of patients receiving treatment for AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and pose a major
challenge to public health (WHO 2004, Levine et al. 2008, Hawkes 2011). In general, stockouts of
medicines in Africa have been attributed to procurement delays (ALMA 2011), fund disbursement
delays (Lane and Glassman 2008, Celasun and Walliser 2007), and insufficient visibility of stock
levels in peripheral health facilities (Shretta and Yadav 2012). While the existing literature does
include rich contextual observations of stockouts, rigorous quantitative research on their causes is
lacking.
This paper is an empirical study of the relationship between national stockout risks for health
products purchased with Global Fund grants in Africa and the process used by the Global Fund
for performance monitoring and procurement fund disbursements. Specifically, we leverage publicly
available historical data for Global Fund grants in Africa between 2002 and 2013 to build a discrete-
event inventory simulation model predicting the joint impact of procurement and grant disbursement
processes on national drug availability in recipient countries. This model and some of its assumptions
(e.g., single product, deterministic demand, and single funding source) may appear simplistic at
first glance. Notably however, we are able to validate its predictive accuracy against cumulative
stockouts inferred from historical grant implementation lengths, the primary output measure of
interest. These validation results provide some justification of our use of this model to address the
following main questions:
1. What is the impact of the grant recipient performance monitoring frequency (i.e., the scheduled
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frequency of grant disbursements and reporting and monitoring activities) used by the Global
Fund on the stockouts experienced by receiving countries? The results discussed in §4.1 suggest
that grants with higher reporting frequency exhibit substantially higher stockout risks. Hence,
over the first 11 years of the Global Fund, there was a clear effective trade-off between the
extent of its performance monitoring activities and the effectiveness of the procurement funds
it disbursed.
2. Are there some geographic patterns affecting the risks of stockouts experienced by Global
Fund grant recipients? We find that the African regions used internally by the Global Fund
for organizational purposes constitute a substantial driver of stockout risks variability, with
grant recipients in East Africa facing significantly higher stockout risks than in other regions.
This suggests that a substantial fraction of the stockouts facing grant recipients are driven
by organizational features and specific processes used by the Global Fund, as opposed to
underlying risk factors associated with these recipients (see §4.2).
3. What is the potential impact on stockout risks of various process modifications considered
by the Global Fund? We find that front loading of disbursement schedules has the potential
to reduce expected stockouts much more significantly than regional buffer stocks or bridge
financing (see §4.3).
By exemplifying the application of standard operations management research methods to in-
vestigate global health challenges (Garnett et al. 2011, Kraiselburd and Yadav 2013), this work
may inform the policies of the Global Fund, but also other international financing institutions us-
ing performance-based financing. This paper also presents contextual information and delineates
research questions that may be useful to other researchers interested in global health operations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After a review of existing related work in §2,
we discuss the definition, estimation and validation of our empirical inventory model in §3. Section
§4 presents the experiments performed with that model and their results. Concluding remarks in §5
include a summary of our findings and their implications as well as a discussion of future research
opportunities. In the remainder of this introduction, we provide additional background on the
Global Fund’s funding process (in §1.1) and discuss various potential or actual interventions related
to that process (in §1.2).
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1.1 The Global Fund’s Grant Funding Process until 2013
Following funding round announcements by the Global Fund roughly once a year, nominated or-
ganizations (governments, NGOs or private sector institutions) called principal recipients (PR)
submit proposals for Global Fund financing for disease-specific programs. Subsequent approval by
the Global Fund of a total program budget sets out a disbursement schedule of successive reporting
periods for the awarded grants, each typically 90 or 180 days (minimum 90, maximum 360 days).
The reporting frequency used for each program is determined by the Global Fund’s perception of
the risks associated with its implementation. Implementation risks may stem, for example, from
overspending or lack of respect of budget lines, lack of suitable accounting software and procedure,
excessive use of cash payments, absence of supporting documentation for expenditures, inadequate
storage and distribution of pharmaceuticals, lack of transparent procedures to select or monitor
subcontractors and data quality problems 1.
After each period, PRs submit a progress report and fund disbursement request for the next
period that must be consistent with the needs defined in the initial proposal. The first disbursement
includes an additional cash buffer of three months, and similar buffers may be subsequently approved
by the Global Fund (Global Fund 2012b).
In order to coordinate various aspects of the relationship with PRs, the Global Fund employs fund
portfolio managers who each focus on a couple of countries and are organized in regional teams (for
example, Africa is divided in four regions). In addition, the Global Fund contracts local fund agents
(academic institutions, private management consulting firms) to audit and assess programs on their
behalf. Based on these agent recommendations, the Global Fund may issue program evaluation
scores including:
 A - meeting or exceeding performance expectations;
 B1 - adequate performance;
 B2 - inadequate performance but with demonstrated potential; and
 C - unacceptably poor performance; may be discontinued.
Historically, the first two years of a grant were called Phase I, which recipients could often extend
by a few months through specific ad-hoc requests. To ensure more predictable long-term funding
1Some analysis of the historical drivers of grant reporting frequency is discussed in §D.2 in the online supplement
5
beyond that first phase, recipients could then submit funding continuation applications for another
three years called Phase II. Out of the 461 grants whose Phase I ended during the period of study,
325 (70%) were approved for Phase II funding. Formal evaluations by the Global Fund during
Phase I have been far less systematic than during Phase II.
In principle, based on these scores, the Global Fund will determine its response to disbursement
requests in each period. The procedure is repeated every period, with the most recent evaluation
score being from the preceding period. Disbursement delays are common, and may result from
missing documentation, PRs not completing performance-related preconditions identified by fund
agents, or resource constraints affecting either the Global Fund or PRs. Because grants occasionally
get discontinued due to poor performance and public financing is distrusted in low-income countries,
disbursement completion is nearly always required before associated procurement orders can be
placed from vendors. Therefore, disbursement delays can prompt emergency searches for alternative
funding sources and/or affect the continuity of the local drug supply (Brugha et al. 2004).
1.2 Process Modifications Considered by the Global Fund
To reduce stockouts of medicines at the national level, several interventions related to the Global
Fund financing and procurement processes have been considered. They include Pledge Guarantee
for Health, a bridge financing scheme developed by the United Nations Foundation to provide funds
for the period between grant approval and disbursement (UNDP 2011), which was used for the first
time in the field in 2013, and international or regional buffer stocks designed to reduce procurement
lead times (Global Fund 2011), which were tested for the first time in the field in late 2012.
In late 2012, the Global Fund announced an intention to completely redesign its legacy funding
process (Global Fund 2013). While the core principles, methods for investment project selection
and financing allocation are already in place, important operational features related to procurement
and disbursement are still not unified and public. The present paper, which analyzes the largest
currently available dataset on performance-based financing, thus informs the operational aspects of
this initiative.
2 Related Literature
Existing quantitative studies of Global Fund grant operations have examined the factors influencing
grant evaluation scores (Radalet and Siddiqi 2007) and cumulative disbursements (Cohen, Singh
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and O’Brien 2008, Lu et al. 2006). Fan et al. (2013) have recently argued that current incentive
mechanisms are not adequate as performance ratings, are not replicable by external observers, and
not sufficiently connected with actual funding decisions. Our work extends this stream of research by
characterizing the factors affecting Global Fund disbursement and procurement lead-times, and by
quantifying the link between these lead-times and the risks of national stockouts of health products
faced by Global Fund grant recipients in Africa.
There is also a recent body of work on operational issues related to donor funding for global
health that is relevant to large-scale subsidy programs. In particular, Tougher et al. (2012) provide
an empirical study of the Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria commodities program (AMFm)
showing that subsidies combined with supporting interventions can rapidly improve availability,
price and market share of quality-assured artemisinin-based combination therapies. Theoretical
models of subsidies include Taylor and Xiao (2014), which consider the effectiveness of sales vs.
purchase subsidies in improving the availability of malaria drugs, and show that the donor should
only subsidize purchases and not sales; Levi et al. (2014) analyze an optimization model showing
that uniform subsidies to competing manufacturers maximize consumption under some assumptions.
In contrast, our work focuses on grants that are used for the full funding of procurement activities
by grant recipients (as opposed to subsidies), which is the traditional and predominant funding
channel used by the Global Fund.
Several papers in the broader operations management literature also consider the implications
of uncertain lead times (Song 1994, Kouvelis and Li 2008, Wang and Tomlin 2009, Song et al.
2010) and financing (Buzacott and Zhang 2004, Chao et al. 2008, Gong et al. 2014) on inventory
systems. Most relevant in this body of work is arguably the theoretical analysis by Natarajan and
Swaminathan (2014), which characterizes the optimal procurement policy for a health product in
the presence of funding uncertainty over a finite time horizon. While their mathematical model
is closely related to our work, our intended contribution is an empirical one that focuses on the
Global Fund and performance-based funding. This contextual focus is motivated by the dominant
role currently played by the Global Fund in the global financing of procurement of health products
relative to other agencies such as UNICEF that primarily support in-country implementations of
health programs and use more traditional fund transfer mechanisms.
This has important modeling implications, because under the performance-based funding mecha-
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nism used by the Global Fund, grant recipients submitting fund disbursement requests are required
to document the satisfactory use of funds previously disbursed during past grant review periods,
consistent with the initial grant agreement (see §1.1). Therefore, Global Fund grant recipients have
strong incentives to commit funds quickly after their disbursements. This can be verified empiri-
cally from our dataset, where 79% of the 3027 procurement orders funded by Global Fund grants
between 2002 and 2012 were placed in the two weeks preceding and following a fund disbursement.
This occurred even though the Global Fund grants we consider involved disbursement inter-arrival
times of three to six months (delays of up to two weeks between disbursement approval notification
and actual fund transfer are observed). Given the various steps involved in public procurement
processes and related data entry issues, it is also possible that many of the remaining 21% of orders
were in fact committed in the days following a fund disbursement. This justifies our model as-
sumptions that procurement orders are placed immediately after fund disbursements, and that the
procurement policy of Global Fund recipients (i.e., order timing and quantity decisions) is entirely
determined by the disbursement schedule.
In contrast, Natarajan and Swaminathan (2014) derive the optimal inventory policy for a more
traditional and less constrained theoretical procurement model involving inventory holding costs
and interest income for unused funds, and where there is no endogenous relationship between the
use of funds by recipients and the timing of future disbursements. Hence, the focus of our work
is on the empirical link between stockout risks and the grant-recipient interaction process, rather
than determining an optimal procurement policy. Notably both papers establish, in their respective
motivating contexts, that uncertainty in disbursement timing has a substantial negative impact on
service levels.
Finally, our work includes a case study on the operations of a major global health organization,
and an empirical analysis of related data resulting in validated distributional forecasts of procure-
ment lead times for several important categories of health products in Africa. Other references
providing contextual information and data about global health supply chains include Yadav (2007),
which discusses long and unpredictable procurement lead times for essential commodities in Zam-
bia and their relation to drug stockouts; and Gallien et al. (2016), which contains a detailed case
study of the public distribution of pharmaceuticals in Zambia and presents related datasets and a
validated simulation model.
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3 Simulation Model
Our simulation model is designed to characterize the empirical relationship between actual disburse-
ment lead-times linked to the Global Fund performance monitoring process, actual procurement
lead-times for health products, and the risks of national stockouts in African countries receiving
Global Fund grants. In addition, we want to evaluate the relative effectiveness of various possible
interventions for reducing these stockout risks (see §1.2).
We emphasize that our objective is therefore not to develop realistic predictions of inventory
levels of actual products in specific facilities of recipient countries at any point in time. Such an
objective would likely imply a considerably more complex model than is formulated here, and require
more detailed data than was available to us for this study. More importantly, such a detailed tactical
model would need to capture many more idiosyncratic aspects associated with any specific country
setting, and thus likely fail to support our intended examination of the Global Fund’s procurement
and funding processes across many countries in Africa. In summary, the model to be presented
here attempts to combine empirical grounding and validated predictions with a broad and strategic
policy perspective.
In the remainder of this section, we first provide in §3.1 a precise definition of our model structure.
We then describe the data used (§3.2.1) and the methods followed for estimating key model input
data, including procurement lead times (§3.2.2), disbursement interarrival times (§3.2.3) and grant
ratings (§3.2.4). Finally, we discuss the results of our model validation experiments in §3.3. Figure
1 provides an overall schematic methodology overview, and we also refer the reader to B in the
online supplement for a more detailed discussion of our model assumptions than is provided here.
3.1 Model Structure Definition
Our discrete-event model simulates the inventory level Iijmlpt on day t of a single health product m
procured to a central location of a country j by principal recipient i with a Global Fund grant in
phase p ∈ {Phase I, Phase II} with reporting period l ∈ {90 days, 180 days}. In many countries, this
central location would correspond to the national warehouse where public procurement orders are
delivered before that inventory is shipped to patient-facing health facilities. While many principal
recipients, such as ministries of health, operate in a single country (so that j is entirely determined
by i), others such as the United Nations Development Programme operate in a number of African
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Figure 1: Diagram of study methodology
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countries. The model is instantiated for 130 principal recipients in 53 African countries and the five
types of health products m procured with Global Fund grants, where
m ∈ {anti-malarial, anti-tuberculosis, anti-retroviral, malaria prevention, HIV prevention}. (m-1)
Demand is assumed to deplete available inventory at a constant and deterministic rate, nor-
malized to 1 per day. Our model does not capture potential changes in health product prices, so
inventory levels and disbursement amounts are both measured in duration of demand coverage. We
define demand occurring when there is no inventory as a stockout and record it as lost.
Inventory is replenished by deliveries from suppliers, which are affected by their procurement
lead times as well as the timing and amount of disbursements by the Global Fund, which are them-
selves affected by the ratings obtained during the previous reporting period. The remainder of this
subsection defines the deterministic inputs, probabilistic inputs and dynamics of this replenishment
model.
3.1.1 Deterministic Model Inputs
The baseline initial inventory available at the time origin Iijmlp0 is set to 180 days or 6 months of
demand, because this is the recommended inventory level stated in several existing guidelines for
preventing stockouts (Ministry of Health, Uganda 2012, Global Fund 2006). For sensitivity analysis,
it is varied between 0 and 9 months in increments of 3 months:
Baseline: Iijmlp0 = 180 days. Sensitivity: I
ijmlp
0 ∈ {0, 90, 180, 270} days. (Input-I-2)
The initial grant rating Ri0 is set to the most frequent rating in the historical disbursement
database for the principal recipient considered (see data description in §3.2.1).
The total budget disbursed is set to 3 × 365 days or three years of demand (typical length of
Phase II). This total grant budget is disbursed in several installments over the grant lifecycle. The
nominal amount f of each disbursement is set to the amount necessary to cover demand for one
scheduled grant period of length l (90 or 180 days) plus a cash buffer b expressed as a fraction
(see §1.1), so that f = (1 + b) × l. The baseline cash buffer is set at b = 10% as suggested by the
Global Fund (Global Fund 2012b). For sensitivity analysis, it is varied between -20% and 100% in
increments of 10%:
Baseline: b = 10%. Sensitivity: b ∈ {−20%,−10%, 0%, . . . , 100%}. (Input-b-3)
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All disbursements are equal to the nominal amount f except when the remaining budget is smaller
than f , at which point the last disbursement is set to the remaining budget. The total number of
disbursements is thus d(3× 365)/fe.
3.1.2 Probabilistic Model Inputs
The first disbursement occurs at the start of the simulation horizon. Each disbursement marks the
beginning of a new grant reporting period, so the duration of reporting period k is the time interval
between the (k + 1)-th and k-th disbursements, defined as the k-th disbursement interarrival time,
modeled as a random variable and denoted DITk.
As discussed in §2, each grant disbursement is immediately and entirely committed to a pro-
curement order for the product. The quantity purchased then is added to the inventory after a
procurement lead time representing the time between order placement and delivery, which is mod-
eled as a random variable denoted PLTk.
Following the process outlined in §1.1, the Global Fund assigns a new grant rating to each
principal recipient i during each reporting period k, which we denote Rik and model as a Markov
chain.
Disbursement interarrival times DITk, procurement lead times PLTk and grant ratings R
i
k are
the model’s uncertain quantities whose effects on inventory and stockout levels are simulated. The
following states the input labels used in the remainder of the paper for these quantities as well as
the exact sections where their estimation procedures are discussed:
PLTk : Section §3.2.2 (Input-PLT-4)
DITk : Section §3.2.3 (Input-DIT-5)
Rik : Section §3.2.4 (Input-R-6)
3.1.3 Model Dynamics and Outputs
Each simulation replication up involves simulation time steps of one day indexed by t and lasts for
the time required to satisfy three years of demand (nominal duration of Phase II), which is denoted
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by T ijmlp in the following. The key model outputs are defined as follows:
Replenishment indicator: Ot =
{
1 if t =
k∑
κ=1
DITκ + PLTk for some k; 0 otherwise
}
(Output-O-7)
Inventory evolution: Iijmlpt+1 = (I
ijmlp
t − 1)+ + Ot ×min(f, 3× 365− f ×
t−1∑
τ=1
Oτ )
(Output-I-8)
Daily lost demand: Sijmlpt = (1− Iijmlpt )+ (Output-St-9)
Total lost demand: Sijmlp =
3×365∑
t=1
Sijmlpt (Output-S-10)
Time to fulfil demand: T ijmlp = 3× 365 + Sijmlp (Output-T-11)
Equation (Output-O-7) defines a daily indicator function associated with the receipt of a pro-
curement order. Equation (Output-I-8) captures inventory dynamics, which are characterized by a
normalized demand quantity of 1 unit per day, lost unsatisfied demand, and replenishments occur-
ing on the times defined by (Output-O-7) involving quantities corresponding to the minimum of the
nominal disbursement per period f and the total remaining budget (see §3.1.1). The daily stockout
variable Sijmlpt defined by (Output-St-9) provides the cumulative stockout level S
ijmlp when summed
over three years according to (Output-S-10), so that in (Output-T-11) the time T ijmlp required to
satisfy three years of demand is equal to three years plus the stockouts Sijmlp accumulated over
that nominal period.
Figure 2 shows a sample simulation replication output for illustration and Table 1 summarizes
notation.
3.1.4 Process Modifications Considered
We use simple modifications of the model defined above to simulate three possible major interven-
tions related to Global Fund financing and procurement processes introduced in §1.2, as follows:
Instantaneous Replenishment (IR): Immediate delivery of all procurement orders e.g., from
an international or regional buffer stock (warehouse managed by a third-party for the purpose
of storing inventory closer to the PR and thus reducing procurement lead times, Global Fund
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Table 1: Model notation summary
I/O Type Notation Definition Value
In
p
u
ts
D
et
er
m
in
is
ti
c
i Principal recipient 130 distinct recipients
j African country 53 distinct countries
region(j) African region of country j {North, South, East, West & Central}
land(j) Indicator if country j is landlocked {0,1}
m Health product type (m-1)
l Reporting period length (days) {90, 180}
p Grant lifecycle phase {Phase I, Phase II}
Ri0 Initial grant rating Most frequent for i in dataset
Iijmlp0 Initial available inventory (Input-I-2)
b Per-period buffer level (Input-b-3)
f Per-period disbursement amount f = (1 + b)l
t Time index {1, ..., T}
k Period index {1, ..., d3× 365/fe}
R
an
d
om
PLTk Procurement lead time in period k (Input-PLT-4)
DITk Disbursement inter-arrival time in period k (Input-DIT-5)
Rik Grant rating in period k (Input-R-6)
O
u
tp
u
ts
R
an
d
om
Ot Inventory replenishment indicator (Output-O-7)
Iijmlpt Inventory position at day t (Output-I-8)
Sijmlpt Lost demand on day t (Output-St-9)
Sijmlp Total lost demand over three years (Output-S-10)
T ijmlp Time to satisfy three years of demand (Output-T-11)
2011). This intervention can be captured in the model by replacing the procurement lead
time input (Input-PLT-4) with:
PLTk = 0 (Input-PLT-IR-12)
Bridge Financing (BF): A third party loan for an amount equal to the next anticipated disburse-
ment triggers an advance procurement order placement whenever the DIT exceeds the nominal
grant period length l (90 or 180 days), consistent with the definition of Pledge Guarantee for
Health (UNDP 2011). The principal of such loans are then paid back to the third party lender
upon grant disbursement. Ignoring financing costs, this intervention can be captured in the
model by replacing the inventory replenishment indicator (Output-O-7) with:
Ot =
{
1 if t =
k−1∑
κ=1
DITκ + min(DITk, l) + PLTk for some k; 0 otherwise
}
(Output-O-BF-13)
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Figure 2: Illustrative simulated sample path of inventory position
Illustrative simulated sample path of inventory position Iijmlpt and stockout level S
ijmlp
t over time. Grant monitoring
period length l and initial inventory coverage are equal to 180 days. The cash buffer level is b = 10%, so that the
per-period disbursement f = (1 + b)l is 198 days. DIT1, DIT2, DIT3 and PLT1, PLT2, PLT3 denote successive real-
izations of DIT and PLT, respectively. In this illustration stockout occurs from May to July 2016 due to unavailability
of funds and from July to December 2016 due to procurement lead time.
Synchronized Financing (SF): In this intervention, nominal grant disbursement amounts are
increased to cover one and a half reporting periods, which can be captured in the model by
replacing (Input-b-3) with:
b = 50% (Input-b-SF-14)
To enable meaningful comparisons, overall grant budget is unchanged and disbursements stop
when that budget is exhausted. That is, in this intervention the funding schedule is gradually
moved forward in time or front-loaded (Natarajan and Swaminathan 2014), but the total
amount disbursed over the grant lifecycle remains the same.
3.2 Input Data Estimation
We discuss the datasets used (§3.2.1), then the estimation procedures for procurement lead times
(§3.2.2), disbursement inter-arrival times (§3.2.3) and grant ratings dynamics (§3.2.4).
3.2.1 Data Description
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The Price and Quality Reporting database is a publicly available database maintained by the Global
Fund, where each principal recipient of a procurement grant is required to report all purchases of
health products from the following five categories: anti-retroviral drugs, anti-malarial drugs, anti-
tuberculosis drugs and prevention of malaria and HIV (Global Fund 2012c). The data contains
information about the contents of the procurement order, the order placement and delivery dates
and the supplier used (distributor/wholesales or directly from manufacturer). There are 3027 pro-
curement orders delivered from 2002 to the end of 2012.
Our second main data source is a dataset of 2068 disbursements from the Global Fund to principal
recipients in 53 countries in Africa from January 2005 to June 2012, obtained from the Global Fund
web site (Global Fund 2012d). The variables in this dataset include grant number and disease
program funded, disbursement date, reporting period start and end date, and when applicable
rating for the previous reporting period data. Disbursements within the first two years of each
grant lifecycle are identified as Phase I, all others as Phase II.
The third dataset used in the study is the Global Fund’s grant data, where each grant approved
by the Global Fund is recorded together with the planned start and end dates for both Phase I and
Phase II (Global Fund 2012d). There are 461 grants for which Phase I was completed by end of
2012.
3.2.2 Procurement Lead Time Estimation
We obtained historical procurement lead times (PLTs) from the Price and Quality Reporting dataset
and estimated a number of econometric models in order to identify the main factors affecting them
(see section §A.1 of the online supplement for more details). This analysis led to the selection of a
subset of three explanatory variables for PLTs in our model: the product category m; the geographic
region of the grant recipient in Africa according to the aggregation of countries used internally by
the Global Fund for organizational purposes region(j) ∈ {East, South, North, West & Central};
and whether the receiving country is landlocked land(j) ∈ {0, 1}.
The low R2 in Table A1 suggests a non-linear relationship between PLTs and these factors.
Since we have no prior hypothesis about a particular functional relationship between them, we
construct a non-parametric distributional forecast for each combination (m, region(j), land(j)) de-
noted PLT(m, region(j), land(j)). The selection of only three explanatory variables was driven by
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the low minimum number of historical data points across these combinations (18). As a result, the
addition of additional explanatory variables helping to reduce the model’s unpredictable variability
(e.g., a country’s road quality) would have come at a cost to predictive validity.
We validate the predictive accuracy of these forecasts using repeated out-of-sample evaluation
of their predictive accuracy using 1000 randomly selected partitions of the dataset into separate
estimation and evaluation sub-samples. For each partition, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to
compare the distributional forecast estimated in-sample and the empirical out-of-sample distribution
of PLTs (Arlot and Celisse 2010). As a maximum of 67 repetitions (mean 46) were rejected
at the 5% significance level across all data categories for that test, we conclude that our model of
PLTs seems suitably accurate for our purposes, despite admittedly not controlling for any other
explanatory variables affecting PLT than the three discussed above.
3.2.3 Disbursement Inter-Arrival Time Estimation
To construct a probabilistic model of disbursement inter-arrival times (DITs) for simulation pur-
poses, we followed an approach similar to the one just described for estimating PLTs. Specifically,
a regression analysis of historical DITs obtained from the disbursement dataset (see §A.2 in the
online supplement) along with predictive validity considerations led the selection of the reporting
period length l ∈ {90, 180}, the country region region(j) and the principal recipient’s rating in the
previous period Rik as the three main explanatory factors for that variable. The simulation of DIT
for each principal recipient i in period k thus relies on a distributional forecast constructed for each
combination (l, region(j), Rik) as a non-parametric estimate of the distribution of DITs over the
corresponding subset of historical data.
We likewise evaluated predictive validity for our distributional forecast of DITs using 1000 ran-
domly selected partitions of the dataset into estimation and evaluation sub-samples. As a maximum
of 63 repetitions (mean 42) were rejected at the 5% significance level across all data categories
for that test, we conclude that our model of DITs seems suitably accurate for our purposes. We also
note that, because of the limited number of data points available for the individual prediction sub-
sets associated with combinations of explanatory variables, this relatively high predictive validity
results from the omission of possible additional explanatory variables.
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3.2.4 Grant Rating Estimation
Our model simulates successive grant ratings for grants in Phase II as a Markov chain defined
for each principal recipient i over the set R , {A,B1, B2, C(NR)} (see §1.1). We estimated the
associated state transition probabilities for each principal recipient from the historical grant rating
transitions from the disbursement dataset described in §3.2.1. Specifically, for every pair of ratings
(r1, r2) ∈ R2 we estimated the transition probability from r1 to r2 as the fraction of next periods
with rating r2 when the current period rating for that recipient is r1 in the dataset. More details
and estimation results are provided in §A.3.
3.3 Model Validation
As mentioned in §1, the present work does not aim methodological contributions but rather empirical
contributions relative to the funding process used by the Global Fund and its impact on stockouts
of health products in Africa. Consequently, the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of our model with
respect to stockout-related indicators constitutes a more appropriate instrument for evaluating its
realism than an examination of individual model assumptions. For this reason we now discuss our
model’s predictive accuracy, and refer the readers to §B.1 in the online supplement for a qualitative
discussion of these assumptions.
This validation exercise presents a methodological challenge a priori, because we do not have
access to historical data for the total lost demand Sijmlp (see §B.3 for a discussion). Fortunately,
however, we are still able to validate our model by using another relevant model output, namely
the time T ijmlp required to satisfy the demand associated with the total grant budget determined
upfront. Phase II grants are particularly significant here because, unlike Phase I, their planned
length is always three years without potential for extensions (see §1.1). As a result we can compare
the simulated times T ijmlp with actual grant implementation lengths, or total time period over which
the funds from a grant were used, which can be estimated from the first and last disbursement dates.
This validation measure is meaningful because Phase II grants issued by the Global Fund have a
fixed total budget that is determined upfront to precisely cover health program needs for three
years. As a result, any difference between the actual grant implementation length and that initial
planned period of three years indicates a commensurate risk of national stockouts. This can be
seen from equation (Output-T-11), which shows that the difference T ijmlp − 3 × 365 between the
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simulated grant implementation length and the planned three years period provides an estimate
for the shortfall Sijmlp in the procurement funds available to cover demand for the health products
purchased over the actual grant lifecycle.
We formally define the actual grant implementation length for grant g, Tˆ g, as the time between
the first and last disbursement recorded in the available historical grant records (§3.1), plus the
duration of one grant review period l (90 or 180 days), corrected by a multiplier accounting for the
assumed cash buffer level b. Given the information available to us, that definition corresponds to
our best estimate of the actual time period over which the funds from that grant were used.
Using the previous definition, we compute the estimated actual implementation lengths for the
429 grants to 62 principal recipients with at least three grants starting before 1 January 2007
recorded in the grant disbursement dataset (out of total of 461 grants, see §3.2.1). We randomly
select around 80% of each principal recipient’s grants (347 grants) for estimation of PLT, DIT and
rating transition probabilities, and subsequently simulate T ijmlp for each grant in this estimation
sample. We perform 5,000 replications for each combination of initial inventory I0 and cash buffer
level b. Our baseline simulation parameters (6 months of initial inventory and 10% cash buffer level,
see §3.1) minimize ranked probability score across the 347 in-sample grants (Taylor 2012). These
initial conditions and in-sample parameter estimates are then used to simulate T ijmlp for all the
out-of-sample grants.
Table 2 below shows average simulated in-sample implementation lengths obtained with these
baseline parameters, against average actual in-sample and out-of-sample implementation lengths.
While we refer the reader to §4 for a discussion of the drivers of these implementation lengths, for
validation purposes we note here that out-of-sample simulated implementation lengths of 90-day
grants (resp. 180-day grants) are on average only 2.9% shorter (resp. 2.4% longer) than actual out-
of-sample values in Phase I (resp. Phase II). In addition, for 180-day reporting grants these average
relative prediction errors are only +6.7% in Phase I and +4.0% in Phase II.
The online supplement also provides a comparison of the distribution of simulated times T ijmlp
with the distribution of actual implementation lengths Tˆ g of the 82 out-of-sample grants. This
analysis leads to the conclusion that we cannot reject, at the 10% significance level, the hypothesis
that actual out-of-sample observations of the procurement funds missing to cover demand for health
product over a grant lifecycle follow the simulated distribution of the same quantity (see §B.3).
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Table 2: Simulated and actual mean grant implementation lengths
Observed
In-Sample
Observed
Out of Sample Simulated
Phase n
Mean 95% CI
n
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
(days) (days) (days) (days) (days) (days)
90-day
Reporting
Grants
I 96 841 (822, 860) 25 835 (800, 870) 811 (807, 815)
II 47 1317 (1285, 1349) 12 1388 (1329, 1447) 1421 (1414, 1428)
180-day
Reporting
Grants
I 251 779 (771, 787) 57 748 (734, 762) 798 (795, 801)
II 105 1097 (1095, 1117) 18 1103 (1095, 1148) 1147 (1142, 1152)
Notes: Mean implementation length and 95% CI by phase and reporting frequency for actual in-sample and out-
of-sample actual data against simulated predictions generated from in-sample data using baseline parameter values.
Variable n represents sample size.
These results suggest that despite a number of simplifying assumptions, the simulation model and
associated data estimation procedures defined in §3.1 and §3.2 satisfactorily capture the stockout
risks associated with the Global Fund funding and procurement processes for the purpose of this
study.
4 Results and Discussion
The estimation results for the distributional forecasts of the probabilistic input variables DITs and
PLTs reported in sections §A.2 and §A.1 of the online supplement show that both financial and
physical flows related to the supply continuity of health products purchased with Global Fund
grants exhibit substantial unpredictable variability (average coefficient of variation of 0.657 and
0.508 for DITs and PLTs, respectively). Furthermore, a high proportion of historical observations
have DIT longer than the grant reporting period, particularly for 90-day period grants. This
raises concerns that the Global Fund’s disbursement schedules may lack reliability and are slower
than the health programs they are designed to support. To investigate these issues and quantify
their impact on stockouts, in the following section we discuss the results of extensive simulation
experiments performed with the model described in the previous section, and their implications on
the motivating questions mentioned in §1. Specifically, we examine the impact of grant reporting
frequency and geographic region of recipients in §4.1 and §4.2, respectively, then evaluate potential
interventions in §4.3. Within each subsection, we first present the relevant empirical results and
then discuss their implications.
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Table 3: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years for baseline scenario
Health Product Type m
Anti-
Malarial
Anti-
Retroviral
Anti-
Tuberculosis
HIV
Prevention
Malaria
Prevention
Reporting Frequency (days) l 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180
African
Region
North 29.32% 3.07% 29.83% 2.94% 31.55% 4.61% 29.94% 2.22% 31.58% 4.51%
East 44.49% 11.27% 48.11% 11.17% 49.31% 11.75% 47.21% 10.13% 48.53% 10.32%
South 32.14% 5.02% 29.31% 4.24% 38.27% 6.34% 28.03% 3.65% 30.84% 4.27%
West & Central 21.43% 2.60% 21.64% 2.03% 22.64% 2.25% 20.86% 1.70% 21.69% 2.47%
Notes: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years for baseline scenario in Phase II. Results based
on 5,000 replications ensuring the length of the 95% confidence interval is less than 1% of the estimated expected
stockouts for each parameter combination. Results for different grants within each African region aggregated using
weights proportional to total grant amounts.
4.1 Effect of Reporting Frequency on Stockout Risks
A first set of experiments assumed baseline parameters and grants in Phase II. They involved
simulation runs for every (i, j, l,m) combination of principal recipient, country, reporting frequency
and product type in our dataset, or 541 data instances 2. Table 3 includes the resulting estimates of
the average proportion of demand lost over three years, aggregated over each African region, where
the aggregations across principal recipients in the same country and across countries in the same
African region, were performed with weights equal to the corresponding relative volumes of funding
disbursed by the Global Fund. We also refer the reader to Table C1 in the online supplement for
more detailed results at the country level.
A first observation from Table 3 is the high absolute level of predicted national stockout risks for
90-day grants, with an average simulated proportion of demand lost over three years of 28.7% across
90-day grants, reaching a maximum of 49.3% for 90-day tuberculosis grants in East Africa. These
high predicted stockout risks are consistent with the independent field observations of widespread
stockouts in countries receiving Global Fund financing, as reported in §1.
The results shown in Tables 3 and C1 also indicate that the grants for which concerns about
performance or implementation risks led the Global Fund to use a shorter reporting period of 90
days as opposed to 180 days clearly faced substantially higher national stockout risks: with an
average 28.7% lost demand for 90-day vs. 5.3% for 180-day reporting grants, expected lost demand
for 90-day reporting grants ranges from 4 to 20 times that of 180-day grants for the same disease
2The number of data instances is larger than the number of grants in the dataset since HIV and malaria grants
can be used for the purchase of both treatment and prevention drugs
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and country. The result that shorter grant reporting periods are associated with greater stockout
risks may not seem surprising per se, because shorter reporting periods can be seen as imposing
more stringent constraints on cash availability. However, what is both surprising and important
here from a practical standpoint is the substantial extent to which 90-day grants impact stockout
risks relative to 180-day grants. In other words, over the first 11 years of the Global Fund there
was a clear effective trade-off between the extent of its performance monitoring activities and the
effectiveness of the funds it disbursed.
It is legitimate to ask whether the difference in expected stockouts between 90-day and 180-
day grants reported in Table 3 may be due to unobservable intrinsic risk factors that could have
influenced the decision to use 90-day or 180-day mechanisms for these grants, rather than the
reporting mechanism itself. While performing a controlled experiment was not a feasible option
in this setting, some observations support the hypothesis of a causal impact of grant monitoring
frequency on stockout risks - see §C.1 in the online supplement.
These results have implications for policy and practice. The substantially higher stockout risks
associated with 90-day grants warrant a detailed examination of whether the relative benefits of
these grants in terms of management incentives are commensurate. It is noteworthy that, because of
the Global Fund’s historical practices, the long DITs estimated in our study may have been caused
by issues affecting any of the activities associated with the execution of a grant, including activities
having nothing to do with the procurement of health commodities. For example, a delay with the
complete documentation of expenses linked to the construction of a health clinic or an advertising
program on condoms could conceivably postpone an incoming disbursement to be used primarily
for procuring medicines.
Because the short-term public health impact of delays affecting medicine procurement may be
quite different from that of delays affecting other grant components, it would seem beneficial for the
Global Fund to manage the schedule of procurement-related disbursements in a specific manner. We
note that other donors also implementing performance-based funding principles such as the World
Bank’s Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and the GAVI Alliance already separate payments
into fixed/predictable and performance-based portions, presumably for the same reasons (Fan et
al. 2013). Applying this model to funding for procurement, the Global Fund could further protect
procurement-related disbursements by reducing their dependence on performance considerations,
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particularly when these considerations are unrelated to procurement.
More generally, the trade-off between fund effectiveness and financing predictability on the one
hand and performance incentives on the other hand could be systematically managed in a segmented
manner across different grant components, increasing overall efficiency. Alternative mechanisms for
preserving patient access to medicines without compromising fund integrity include letters of credit
directly issued to manufacturers and imposing the use of central procurement services similar to
those currently known as Pooled Procurement Mechanism. It is not clear that the Global Fund
systematically uses such alternative mechanisms when performance concerns related to procurement
arise. Interventions including vendor-managed inventory are conceivable, but may be challenging to
implement in this context because the level of trust between buyers and suppliers seems to strongly
influence the success of such relationships (Claassen et al. 2008), and such trust may be difficult to
establish in the presence of creditworthiness concerns.
4.2 Effect of Geographic Location on Stockout Risks
Another important observation from Table 3 is that predicted stockout risks are strongly correlated
with the geographic region of receiving countries. Specifically, expected lost demand for 90-day (resp.
180-day) reporting grants range from around 21% (resp. 2%) in West & Central Africa to around
49% (resp. 11%) in East Africa. In addition, these predicted stockout risks are quite consistent for
each region across product types, suggesting that the geographic region is a more important driver
of stockouts than the type of product being purchased (some comments on the impact of product
type are still included in section §C.2 of the online supplement). Finally, an examination of the
more detailed country-level results provided in section §C of the online supplement reveals that the
variability of predicted stockout risks across countries within the same geographic region is quite
limited.
These results seem hard to rationalize from a public health or performance monitoring stand-
point. It is possible that these geographic regions should actually coincide with some intrinsic
features of recipient countries that would similarly affect the processes used for grant performance
evaluations and disbursements. Given the heterogeneity of countries within these regions along many
dimensions however (Berenguer et al. 2014), this explanation does not seem plausible. Rather, we
have used for this analysis the exact definition of geographic regions used by the Global Fund for
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reporting purposes, and these regions are also reflected in its internal organizational structure – for
example, fund portfolio managers are almost always responsible for countries within a single region.
Thus, these observations strongly suggest that the predicted stockouts are primarily driven by orga-
nizational features and specific processes used by the Global Fund (which are common to countries
in the same region but differ across regions), as opposed to underlying risk factors associated with
individual countries (which presumably differ widely across countries in the same region).
This explanation aligns with observations made independently by Fan et al. (2013) on the basis
of both econometric analysis of historical grant scores and detailed case studies of Global Fund
decisions for several specific countries. Specifically, these authors highlight the lack of transparency
and apparent subjectivity affecting the relationship between grant evaluation scores and actual
disbursement decisions made by Global Fund teams.
Based on this collective evidence, it seems important for the Global Fund to develop processes and
guidelines for evaluating and acting upon grant management performance that are more objective,
globally scalable, and immune from organizational idiosyncrasies. Beyond the Global Fund, these
observations also seem relevant to any other global health funding organization implementing or
considering a performance-based funding model. Specifically, they highlight an important tension
associated with a decentralized organization structured around geography when implementing a
performance-based funding model, namely the benefits of in-depth local knowledge by teams versus
the challenges of implementing a uniform and objective set of evaluation criterias across teams.
4.3 Potential Impact of Policy Interventions
While it is expected that the interventions considered in this paper (reducing procurement lead
times, bridge financing and increasing cash buffers) should all result in some reduction of stockout
risks, the goal of our study is to evaluate the relative benefits of these different interventions.
To that end, we conducted a second larger set of numerical experiments where the simulation
runs were not only defined by the combination (i, j, l,m) of principal recipient, country, reporting
frequency and product type as in the first set of experiments (see §4.1), but also which one of the
three potential interventions discussed in §1.2 and §3.1.4 is being considered. While the primary
performance metric estimated was the proportion of demand lost over three years as before, we also
conducted additional sensitivity analysis experiments to investigate the impact of the evaluation
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Table 4: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years for baseline and
policy interventions
Legacy practice Intervention
Phase I Phase II
Instantaneous Bridge Synchronized
Replenishment Financing Financing
Reporting Frequency (days) l 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180
African
Region
North 29.9% 1.1% 29.7% 3.4% 22.7% 0.8% 26.4% 2.1% 13.7% 1.06%
East 55.1% 5.8% 40.8% 9.1% 33.5% 3.3% 37.5% 6.8% 27.7% 3.08%
South 29.3% 2.3% 24.9% 3.3% 20.1% 1.1% 22.3% 2.0% 10.1% 0.86%
West & Central 23.7% 2.0% 19.5% 2.4% 13.5% 0.5% 16.0% 1.7% 6.5% 0.85%
Notes: Simulated average proportion of demand lost over three years for baseline scenario and three potential inter-
ventions. Results based on 5,000 replications ensuring the length of the 95% confidence interval is less than 1% of
the estimated expected stockouts for each parameter combination. Results across different drugs for each principal
recipient are aggregated using weights proportional to: the number of reported malaria cases in 2010 for anti-malaria
and malaria prevention drugs; the sum of people in need of and on ARV treatment for ARV drugs; the number of
people living with AIDS for HIV prevention drugs; and the number of new TB cases in 2011 for anti-TB drugs (The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). Obtained results for different principal recipients within each African
region are then aggregated using weights proportional to the sum of grant amounts.
period duration (see below). Table 4 reports summary statistics related to these experiments,
where the results of individual simulation runs have been aggregated across countries in the same
geographic region (using the aggregation method described in §4.1) and across product types (see
methodological note in Table 4).
As seen in section §3.1.4 of the model definition, the instantaneous replenishment intervention
effectively amounts to eliminating procurement lead times from the inventory dynamics (i.e. set-
ting the PLTk distributions to zero) while leaving the financial flows (i.e. the DITk distributions)
unchanged. This is a simplified model of an intervention that would consist in practice of setting
up regional buffer stocks that principal recipients may access on a short notice. The simulated
results for this intervention are also meaningful because comparing them with the baseline results
provides an estimation of the specific impact of delays due to procurement lead times as opposed to
disbursement inter-arrival times. Indeed, the results shown in Table 4 suggest that instantaneous
replenishment would decrease expected stockouts between 4.8 and 7.3 percentage points (pp) for
90-day grants, and between 1.9 and 5.8pp for 180-day grants. While this intervention would thus
reduce stockouts to minimal levels for 180-day grants (under 3.5% of demand over three years),
it would unfortunately leave 90-day grants with high levels of stockout exposure (between 13.5%
and 33.5% of demand over three years). These results can be explained by the greater discrep-
ancy observed for 90-day grants between disbursement amounts (designed to cover demand for the
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nominal grant monitoring period) and the actual time between consecutive disbursements (see sec-
tion §A.2 in the online supplement). Consequently, the estimated stockouts for 90-day grants are
primarily driven by DITs as opposed to PLTs, which explains the poor targeting efficiency of the
instantaneous replenishment intervention.
The results shown in Table 4 also suggest that the impact of bridge financing would be limited.
Specifically, bridge financing achieves even lower stockout reductions than instantaneous replenish-
ment, also leaving stockout risks for 90-day grants at relatively high levels (minimum 16% in West &
Central Africa). The explanation is that bridge financing, while making some funds available earlier,
changes neither the amount nor the frequency of the underlying Global Fund disbursement schedule.
That is, bridge funds provide coverage for a nominal grant reporting period (i.e. 90 or 180 days),
but because their disbursement remains linked to the schedule of actual Global Fund disbursements
which are separated by the actual DITs, the time difference between nominal grant review period
and actual DITs remains ultimately unfunded. As a result, the bridge financing policy considered
here, which is consistent with the Pledge Guarantee for Health scheme promoted by the United
Nations Development Fund (see §3.1 and UNDP 2011), does not address the structural problem of
disbursement timing and amount and does not constitute a reliable process for preventing stockouts.
Furthermore, an actual implementation of bridge financing would likely entail additional interest
and financing costs which we conservatively ignore here. Alternative mechanisms are conceivable,
but any implementation increasing disbursement frequency would expose third-party lenders to
financial liability and risks accumulating over time.
Finally, synchronized financing is the only considered intervention substantially reducing stockout
risks for 90-day grants - by between 13pp in West & Central Africa and 16pp in North Africa. In
addition, its associated stockout risks are also low for 180-day grants, and comparable to those
achieved by instantaneous replenishment. The explanation of this relatively high potential impact
is that synchronized financing directly addresses the core issue that planned disbursement amounts
designed to cover demand for review periods of fixed duration (e.g., 90 or 180 days) were not adjusted
to reflect longer actual time periods between disbursements (see discussion of the historical Global
Fund disbursement process in §1.1). Indeed, the additional cash buffers associated with synchronized
financing correct this by effectively making disbursement amounts commensurate with empirical
DITs. Thus, the variability of these empirical DITs across regions thus explains why the uniform
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Figure 3: Fraction of lost demand for different cash buffer levels
Notes: Average simulated fraction of lost demand for different cash buffer levels in each African region: 90-day
reporting grants (A) and 180-day reporting grants (B). Methodology for aggregating results is identical to that
described in the notes of Table 4. Baseline parameters in Phase II are assumed except for cash buffer level. Highlighted
cash buffer levels of 10% and 50% respectively correspond to the baseline scenario and synchronized financing (SF)
intervention.
additional cash buffer level of 50% assumed for the synchronized financing policy in the experiments
reported in Table 4 has an impact which varies across regions.
To further investigate this issue, additional experiments on the synchronized financing policy
reported in Figure 3 show that simulated stockouts are sensitive to the cash buffer level. Specifically,
increasing cash buffer levels generally has a substantial marginal impact on stockouts until levels of
approximately 70% for 90-day grants and 20% for 180-day grants. These thresholds correspond to
a probability of approximately 0.4 for the event that DITk > f : beyond that point the occurence
of stockouts in a given period rapidly become less likely given the DITk distribution tail, so the
marginal benefits of a cash buffer reduce substantially. This sensitivity analysis may inform the
choice of a specific cash buffer level, achieving a good balance between stockout risks and the
financial exposure and/or changes of incentives associated with disbursing more funds upfront.
On the basis of these results, one could conceivably also consider a potential implementation of
synchronized financing involving different cash buffer levels across regions. However, we stress
that these results are mostly driven by the underlying differences in DITs across regions resulting
from different practices across teams within the Global Fund (see §4.2). As a result, addressing
these organizational differences directly would seemingly constitute a more durable solution than
accomodating them through segmented cash buffer levels.
Finally, additional experiments reported in Figure 4 suggest that the stockout reductions asso-
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ciated with these three interventions is sensitive to the time horizon considered. After an initial
period of 6 months corresponding to the initial inventory assumed, the fraction of lost demand
generally increases over time for both reporting periods and all interventions, with the exception of
synchronized financing for 180-day grants. This reflects the fact that, in all cases but the exception
noted, provided funds are insufficient to cover the average time between consecutive disbursement
(i.e., E[DITk] > f), so that stockouts accumulate over time.
Contrasting with the three-year results shown in Table 4, expected lost demand under instan-
taneous replenishment is lower than with synchronized financing up to day 475 (resp. 960) for
90-day (resp. 180-day) reporting grants. This is because instantaneous replenishment advances the
delivery of the first replenishment relative to synchronized financing, which substantially reduces
stockouts at the beginning of the time horizon. Instantaneous replenishment could thus become a
sensible intervention for grants with shorter durations than the current ones, however its implemen-
tation seems more involved than synchronized financing and so associated costs should be carefully
examined.
Figure 4: Fraction of lost demand over various time horizons
Notes: Average simulated fraction of lost demand over various time horizons under baseline parameters and different
interventions, aggregated across African countries: 90-day reporting grants (A) and 180-day reporting grants (B).
Methodology for aggregating results is identical to that described in the notes of Table 4. Initial inventory of 6
months and cash buffer level of 10% assumed for all scenarios except synchronized financing where the cash buffer
level is 50%. Scenarios are Phase II (baseline), Phase I, IR (instantaneous replenishment), BF (bridge financing) and
SF (synchronized financing).
A key implication of these results for the Global Fund is that adjusting disbursement amounts
through a more systematic use of cash buffers reflecting actual disbursement schedules would sub-
stantially benefit public health, and appears more effective in the long term than the other possible
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interventions considered here. Table 4 suggests countries and regions to be targeted in priority
for this intervention, and the high absolute level of estimated stockouts suggest that this may be
time-sensitive in many cases.
5 Conclusion
Our findings provide new evidence on the relationship between global health initiatives and national
health systems by identifying and characterizing the link between the Global Fund’s financing and
disbursement processes and national drug stockout risks over the past decade (WHO 2009). These
results complement observational studies on health product stockouts in Africa (e.g., Pasquet et al.
2010, Oliynyk 2011) and qualitative studies discussing their causes by providing a validated model
generating quantitative predictions of stockout risks and characterizing the role of disbursement and
procurement variability (Shretta and Yadav 2012). Finally, our study provides hitherto unavailable
quantitative predictions of the impact of potential interventions for reducing these risks, and point
to several process redesign opportunities. Beyond the Global Fund, these findings also seem useful
to other global health organizations interested to identify and leverage learnings from the first
large-scale implementation of the performance-based funding model.
Specifically, we find that the higher grant reporting frequency is a substantial driver of stockout
risks, so that over the first 11 years of the Global Fund there was a clear effective trade-off between
the extent of its performance monitoring activities and the effectiveness of the procurement funds
it disbursed. This more generally shows the importance of properly accounting for the resource and
time requirements of performance monitoring activities when planning the execution of performance-
based funding grants. Our results show that East Africa faced much higher and West & Central
Africa much lower stockout risks than the rest. This suggests that the African regions used internally
by the Global Fund for organizational purposes likely constitute a substantial driver of stockout risks
variability because of idiosyncratic and region-specific differences in evaluation and/or disbursement
decision processes. This highlights an organizational tension that seems important to carefully
manage as part of the performance-based funding model, namely the benefits of in-depth local
knowledge by teams dedicated to limited geographic areas versus the challenges of implementing
a uniform and objective set of evaluation criterias across teams. Finally, we find that adjusting
disbursement amounts using cash buffers commensurate with the actual duration of monitoring
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periods has the potential to reduce expected stockouts more significantly than regional buffer stocks
and bridge financing (see §4.3).
The substantial stockout risks imposed upon many Global Fund recipients since 2002 that are
highlighted in this paper seem significant to global health. This may motivate a more extensive
redesign of the Global Fund’s funding model than the changes we could evaluate in this paper on the
basis of historical DIT data, and may have motivated the new funding model initiative announced
by the Global Fund in 2013 (Global Fund 2013a). Indeed, all the interventions considered in our
quantitative study essentially assume that the process used by the Global Fund for the purpose of
monitoring the performance of grant recipients would remain unchanged relative to the collection
period of our DIT data from 2002 to 2013, or at least that any changes considered would not impact
the distribution of disbursement inter-arrival times. However, our study and model do provide a
framework for thinking about further redesign opportunities for this process in a systematic manner.
For example, the assumed lack of correlation between inventory level and DIT points to the
current lack of centralized country stock level information accessible to the Global Fund on a rou-
tine basis for the health products that it is funding. This situation is particularly problematic
when Global Fund managers are confronted with several competing solicitations for expediting dis-
bursements or allocating limited stock or funds available to them in the short term, as this lack
of information may contribute to inefficient decisions with severe consequences. This information
scarcity also complicates the development of proactive and forward-looking approaches for allo-
cating funds and resources, contrasting with the reactive ”fire-fighting” environment generated by
emergency solicitations of recipient countries facing an existing or imminent stock-out crisis (a key
motivation for the support of this study by the Global Fund). Finally, this lack of reliable central-
ized stock level information makes it difficult for the Global Fund to evaluate the performance of
recipient countries in relation to inventory management, and therefore hampers its core performance
monitoring function. More generally, this suggests that other global health organizations involved
in the allocation of procurement funds as part of the performance-based funding model may find it
particularly beneficial to develop some visibility of central inventory levels across recipients.
We see several future research opportunities related to this work. One would be a deeper study
of the longer-term evolution of grant reporting frequency and ratings across multiple successive
grants received by the same principal recipient, possibly using a system dynamics model. Efficiency
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analysis could also shed more light on the specific variables affecting PLTs and DITs. The process
by which incoming fund disbursements are split between procurement orders for different products
seems worthy of study, as is the possible coordination between multiple funding streams. Finally, a
microeconomic model could generate useful knowledge on the relationship and possible contractual
forms between a donor and and a recipients in the context of performance-based financing.
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National Drug Stockout Risks and the Global Fund
Disbursement Process for Procurement
Online Supplement
A Model Input Data
A.1 Procurement Lead Times (PLT)
We analyzed all 3027 procurement orders initiated by principal recipients in 53 African countries
between January 2002 and March 2012 and recorded in the Price and Quality Recording (PQR
database). The PQR database relies on the grant recipient self-reporting the order placement date
as the date when the supplier accepts the order for immediate processing.
We used the PQR database to estimate the Procurement Lead Time (PLT) in our model. For the
purposes of our analysis, we define PLT as the time from the ordering date by which the supplier can
deliver when it is the principal recipient’s intention to receive the order as soon as possible. However,
an occasional practice by grant recipients is to place staggered or pre-planned orders involving the
upfront communication of a schedule of several future target delivery dates; this affects 496 orders
out of 3027 in the dataset. Including such observations in our PLT estimates would lead to over-
estimating the procurement lead time, as for the second and subsequent requested delivery dates in
these orders the lead time is presumably much higher than what the supplier could achieve (some
of these orders are scheduled more than a year in advance for example). This would, in turn, result
in over-estimating stockout levels. Therefore, we excluded those 496 pre-planned orders as well as
65 other outlying orders with a z-score for the lead time greater than 2.5 (these had PLTs greater
than one year and so likely were also pre-planned). Consequently, the results reported in Table 3
could in fact be under-estimating stockout levels. When the 496 pre-planned and 65 outlying orders
described above are included in the estimation of PLTs, the stockout level estimates reported in
Table 3 increase by up to 0.9 percentage points.
We used multiple regression model specifications to identify drivers of PLT variability (see Table
A1) and group the orders into 40 categories characterised by product type, region (East, North,
South and West & Central Africa) and whether the receiving country was landlocked. Additional
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explanatory variables were not included due to the limited sample size of each category. Categories
differing on one dimension only were merged whenever the pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
identical distributions had a p-value larger than 0.5. Distributional forecasts of PLT in each category
were constructed with non-parametric kernel density estimation (Greene 2012). Forecast accuracy
for each category was assessed with 1000-time repeated random sub-sampling validation involv-
ing 80% randomly selected data for in-sample density estimation and comparison with remaining
out-of-sample data using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Arlot and Celisse 2010). A maximum of
67 repetitions were rejected at the 5% significance level across all categories (mean 46).
Multiple regression specifications (1)-(3) show the significance of drug type and African region
when predicting procurement lead times (PLTs) as well as exactly one of the following variables:
whether the country is landlocked or not; whether the procurement order was through voluntary
pooled procurement (VPP) or not; whether there was a pre-paid component of the order. The
results show that PLTs increase on average whenever any of these three characteristics are met.
Specification (1) was selected for the model based on the highest R2. Specifications (4) and (5) show
that procuring through VPP and pre-payment leads to higher average PLTs, even after controlling
for the geographic position of the receiving country. These result suggest that while the VPP
initiative may have been successful at reducing purchasing price, it does not seem to have reduced
procurement lead times, perhaps due to the additional delays associated with pooling procurement
orders for the same products across different principal recipients. Furthermore, linear monthly and
yearly trends were not significant in any of the models and were thus omitted - see Table A1.
The small number of variables in these models limits their R2 to 11-14%. While adding more
explanatory variables (such as country or principal recipient fixed effects) would increase their R2
and fit (i.e., decrease their fitting error), because of the relatively small amount of data available
this would negatively impact their out-of-sample prediction error which is a key criteria for the
present study.
Table A2 shows summary statistics of historical PLTs for the final configuration of categories.
They show substantial variations of procurement lead times across product types m (HIV prevention
and treatment products take 46 days less and 18 days more than malaria prevention products on
average, respectively) and geographic conditions region(j) and land(j) (deliveries to East Africa
take 29 more days, on average, than to West & Central Africa, and landlocked countries take on
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Table A1: Multiple regression model specifications for procurement lead times.
PLT Regression Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drug Type
Baseline: Malaria Prevention
Anti-Malaria -9.41 -6.57 -8.99 -9.17 -6.9
(6.73) (6.95) (6.86) (6.72) (6.79)
Anti-Retroviral 18.02 18.46 17.46 19 19.81
(7.80)** (8.04)** (7.98)** (7.81)** (7.87)**
Anti-TB -26.96 -20.78 -25.55 -26.6 -22.1
(6.05)*** (6.37)*** (6.24)*** (6.05)*** (6.19)***
HIV Prevention -46.61 -42.76 -46.41 -46.58 -43.16
(6.40)*** (6.63)*** (6.56)*** (6.40)*** (6.47)***
African region
Baseline: West & Central
North -1.32 -1.54 -1.48 -1.00 -1.1.0
(4.10) (4.11) (4.13) (4.11) (4.08)
East 28.77 31.78 32.00 29.83 29.69
(3.92)*** (3.90)*** (3.93)*** (3.94)*** (3.91)***
South -13.57 -12.55 -13.13 -12.67 -12.18
(3.49)*** (3.56)*** (3.57)*** (3.50)*** (3.50)***
Landlocked 19.97 19.91 18.99
(1=yes; 0=no) (3.01)*** (3.09)*** (3.11)***
VPP 13.26 12.89
(1=yes; 0=no) (6.03)** (6.14)**
Pre-paid 16.45 15.39
(1=yes; 0=no) (2.99)*** (3.02)***
Observations 3,027 3,027 3,027 3,027 3,027
R-squared 0.131 0.119 0.132 0.132 0.137
Notes: Multiple regressions of PLT on type of drug, African region and: (1) geographic position; (2) whether the
procurement order was pre-paid; (3) whether the order was procured through VPP; (4) geographic positiong and
whether the order was procured through VPP; (5) geographic position and whether the procurement order was
pre-paid. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A2: Summary statistics of procurement lead times (PLT) in days
Number of observations, mean and (5%, 95%) quantiles of PLT in each category; categories were merged whenever
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of common underlying distribution had a p-value larger than 0.5; merged categories
are identified by either an omitted cell border, , or .
African
region
region(j)
Landlocked
(Y/N)
land(j)
Health Product Type m
Anti-
Malarial
Anti-
Retroviral
Anti-
Tuberculosis
HIV
Prevention
Malaria
Prevention
n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles
East
No 222 162 (31, 347) 222 162 (31, 347) 38 231 (112, 289) 61 100 (14,236)
273 133 (31, 241)
Yes
87 128 (35, 266)
29 231 (112, 364) 29 231 (112, 364)
60 73 (13, 151)
South Yes 181 76 (18, 229) 33 122 (52, 420)
166 98 (18, 243)
North
Yes 21 103 (29, 266) 11 160 (64, 234) 11 160 (64, 234)
86 74 (17, 179)
No 62 107 (23, 280)
69 122 (30, 263)
62 107 (23, 280) 184 90 (11, 241)
South No 53 146 (13, 297) 33 122 ( 52, 420) 110 54 (6, 151) 550 66 (8, 168)
West &
Central
No 233 115 (13, 300) 233 115 (13, 300) 233 115 (13, 300) 115 84 (13, 217) 218 84 (9,243)
Yes 36 165 (5, 351) 18 159 (76, 206) 18 159 (76, 206) 25 93 (14, 228) 100 150 (27, 331)
Table A3: Distributional forecasts for procurement lead times: out-of-sample prediction
accuracy
African
region
Landlocked
(Y/N)
Type of Drug
Anti-
Malarial
Anti-
Tuberculosis
Malaria
Prevention
HIV
Prevention
Anti-
Retroviral
K G LN K G LN K G LN K G LN K G LN
East
No 0.067 0.076 0.091 0.067 0.076 0.091 0.058 0.101 0.115 0.045 0.061 0.062
0.045 0.11 (31, 241)
Yes
0.059 0.086 0.103
0.056 0.102 0.105 0.056 0.102 0.105
0.55 0.094 0.08
South Yes 0.048 0.097 0.113 0.039 0.090 0.091
0.066 0.12 0.10
North
Yes 0.033 0.065 0.054 0.029 0.096 0.08 0.029 0.096 0.08
0.059 0.097 0.091
No 0.052 0.076 0.07
0.041 0.079 0.141
0.052 0.076 0.07 0.043 0.081 0.094
South No 0.041 0.129 0.16 0.039 0.090 (0.091 0.050 0.065 0.123 0.049 0.133 0.209
West &
Central
No 0.057 0.104 0.209 0.057 0.104 0.209 0.057 0.104 0.209 0.063 0.095 0.074 0.049 0.231 0.093
Yes 0.042 0.084 0.093 0.043 0.081 0.079 0.043 0.081 0.079 0.036 0.059 0.055 0.047 0.230 0.147
Notes: Fraction of 1000 random out-of-sample validations for which the null hypothesis that the out-of-sample
data is distributed according to the in-sample estimated distribution can be rejected at 5% significance level using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Results reported are for the kernel density estimation (K) and maximum likelihood
estimation of in-sample gamma (G) and log normal (LN) distributions
average 20 more days than non-landlocked ones). The results also suggest that the unpredictable
variability of PLT within categories is substantial (average coefficient of variation is 0.657).
Table A3 provides out-of-sample prediction accuracy of distributional forecasts for procurement
lead time using three different methods of in-sample estimation: kernel density estimation (K);
maximum likelihood estimation of in-sample gamma distribution (G); and maximum likelihood
estimation of in-sample log normal distribution (LN). Since the kernel density estimation method
outperformed the other two in each category, we chose it as the method of in-sample estimation of
PLT.
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A.2 Disbursement Inter-Arrival Times (DIT)
Excluding 24 negative values, 38 disbursements from potentially discontinued C-rated grants, 133
disbursements to multi-national principal recipients, and retaining 90- and 180-day reporting fre-
quencies left 1658 DIT observations that we used for estimation and validation purposes (97% of
the 2068 disbursements in the dataset). The other reporting frequencies (e.g. 150 days) were of
small incidence and did not allow for a reliable analysis of disbursements within the same reporting
frequency. 90-day grants account for 48% of disbursements in the resulting dataset, and 180-day
grants account for 52%, respectively. Note that the number of DIT observations is smaller than the
number of disbursements in the data since each DIT uses two disbursement data points.
We used multiple regression model specifications to identify drivers of DIT variability (see Table
A4), and grouped disbursements into 40 categories characterized by region (Eastern, Northern,
Southern and West & Central Africa), grant rating in previous reporting period (A, B1, B2, NR
[non-rated] and Phase I) and period length (90 or 180 days). The methods for merging categories,
constructing and assessing distributional forecast of DIT were identical to those used for PLT. Kernel
density estimation resulted in a maximum of 63 repetitions rejected at the 5% significance level
across all categories (mean 42). Prediction accuracy of the four categories with less than 5 data
points was not assessed (baseline stockout levels in Table 4 changed by less than 0.02% when these
categories were removed).
Multiple regression specifications (1)-(4) show the significance of Phase I, previous grant rating
in Phase II, African region, a linear monthly time trend since the first disbursement of the grant and
grant disease in predicting DIT. African region was a significant predictor of DIT in all specifications
for all period lengths, as well as a subset of Phase I and the previous period grant rating in Phase
II. The linear time trend was not a significant predictor in specification (2). The grant disease was
also not a significant predictor, even before controlling for the previous grant rating in Phase II
(specification 4). Therefore, specification (1) was selected for the predictive model of DIT on the
basis of its associated number of significant predictors. The interpretation of the relatively low R2
is the same as for PLT above.
Summary statistics of historical DIT per category in Table A5 exhibit substantial variations
across prior grant rating Rik and geographic region region(j). On average, DITs in East Africa
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Table A4: Multiple regression model specifications for disbursement inter-arrival times
DIT
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4)
90-day 180-day 90-day 180-day 90-day 180-day 90-day 180-day
Phase I
-4.53 33.04 -5.42 33.38 -4.76 32.79 9.86 30.42
(7.24) (8.18)*** (6.17) (7.73)*** (7.27) (8.21)*** (7.11) (6.78)***
Phase II
Grant Rating
(previous period)
Baseline: A
B1 5.22 -24.05 5.07 -23.81 4.34 -23.4
(8.17) (7.56)*** -7.67 (7.57)*** -8.26 (7.60)***
B2 -2.39 -16.2 -2.71 -15.38 -3.32 -14.57
(9.08) (11.93) (9.34) (11.97) (9.15) (12.03)
NR 80.51 -11.98 80.45 -11.51 80.11 -11.16
(13.50)*** (15.58) (13.34)*** (15.56) (13.47)*** (15.59)
African region
Baseline:
West &
Central
North 33.88 27.46 32.28 24.92 33.49 25.71 23.47 31.57
(8.77)*** (8.89)*** (8.82)*** (8.98)*** (8.96)*** (8.74)*** (8.64)*** (9.08)***
East 44.93 40.86 44.13 42.64 45.16 40.91 39.89 45.91
(12.07)*** (8.03)*** (11.89)*** (7.91)*** (12.28)*** (8.13)*** (8.15)*** (12.23)***
South 16.42 22.95 15.16 18.27 13.89 22.28 20.01 15.46
(7.85)** (8.39)*** (8.46)** (8.52)*** (8.06)* (8.39)*** (8.22)** (8.44)*
Linear -2.67
(2.04)
-1.27
(1.33)Monthly
Trend
GF Disease
Baseline:
Tuberculosis
HIV/AIDS -2.13 -5.17 -6.73 -5.57
(7.5) (7.78) (7.8) (7.76)
Malaria -1.95 -11.23 -12.4 -5.9
(8.59) (8.19) (8.11) (8.7)
Observations 814 844 814 844 814 844 814 844
R-squared 0.103 0.069 0.106 0.07 0.105 0.071 0.058 0.036
Notes: Multiple regressions of DIT for 90- and 180-day reporting grants on African region, grant Phase and: (1)
previous period grant rating; (2) previous period grant rating and a linear monthly trend; (3) previous period grant
rating and GF diease; (4) GF disease. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Summary statistics of disbursement inter arrival times (DIT) in days
Number of observations, mean and (5%, 95%) quantiles of DIT in each category; categories were merged whenever
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test of common underlying distribution had a p-value larger than 0.5; merged categories
are identified by either an omitted cell border or .
Grant Rating rik−1
World
Region
region(j)
A B1 B2 NR Phase I
n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles n Mean Quantiles
90-day
Reporting
Grants
l = 90
West &
Central 32 130 (35. 308) 64 139 (28, 367)
19 146 (77, 222)
356 149 (39, 321) 356 149 (39, 321)
North
17 184 (61, 359)
15 163 (42, 349) 2 275 (177, 373)
261 174 (44, 360)
South
64 139 (28. 367)
4 117 (76, 156)
East 3 261 (168, 335) 1 334 56 186 (28, 367)
180-day
Reporting
Grants
l = 180
North 24 178 (34, 357) 64 179 (61, 354) 23 125 (20, 223) 23 125 (20, 223) 53 238 (67, 383)
West &
Central 57 159 (68, 294) 132 154 (33, 270)
11 135 (27, 211) 11 124 (40, 333) 95 192 (58, 369)
South
77 231 (124, 377)
31 177 (26, 348) 23 154 (46, 323) 53 207 (66, 368)
East 63 185 (35, 340) 11 260 (74, 391) 21 180 (31, 362) 103 206 (49, 371)
are 40–45 days longer than in West & Central Africa; DITs of 180-day grants in Phase I are 33
days longer than in Phase II; and DITs of 90-day non-rated grants in Phase II were 80 days longer
than those rated A. Unpredictable variability of DIT within each category is also substantial (mean
coefficient of variation is 0.508). Consistent with previous independent observations (Aidspan 2005),
mean DIT is larger than grant reporting period in 19 out of the 24 categories, including all categories
with 90-day reporting periods. Finally, no significant time trend of DIT during a grant lifecycle is
observed.
Table A6: Distributional forecasts of disbursement inter-arrival times: out-of-sample pre-
diction accuracy
Grant Rating
A B1 B2 NR Phase I
90-day Reporting Frequency
African Region K G LN K G LN K G LN K G LN K G LN
West & Central 0.035 0.048 0.048 0.043 0.066 0.054
0.043 0.147 0.144
0.044 0.092 0.111 0.044 0.092 0.111
North
0.039 0.086 0.078
0.042 0.056 0.061
0.057 0.101 0.117
South
0.043 0.066 0.054
East 0.044 0.083 0.129
180-day Reporting Frequency
North 0.038 0.145 0.087 0.052 0.81 0.87 0.038 0.129 0.118 0.038 0.129 0.118 0.044 0.069 0.061
West & Central 0.046 0.108 0.112
0.044 0.187 0.232
0.027 0.084 0.078 0.063 0.156 0.163 0.050 0.089 0.106
South 0.043 0.059 0.062 0.053 0.137 0.131 0.035 0.096 0.098 0.054 0.081 0.069
East 0.050 0.098 0.206 0.041 0.094 0.081 0.031 0.116 0.064 0.046 0.116 0.137
Notes: Fraction of 1000 random out-of-sample validations for which the null hypothesis that the out-of-sample
data is distributed according to the in-sample estimated distribution can be rejected at 5% significance level using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Results reported are for the kernel density estimation (K) and maximum likelihood
estimation of in-sample gamma (G) and log normal (LN) distributions.
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Table A6 provides out-of-sample prediction accuracy of distributional forecasts for disbursement
inter-arrival times using three different methods of in-sample estimation: kernel density estimation
(K); maximum likelihood estimation of in-sample gamma distribution (G); and maximum likelihood
estimation of in-sample log normal distribution (LN). Since the kernel density estimation method
outperformed the other two in each category, we chose it as the method of in-sample estimation of
PLT.
A.3 Grant Rating Model Estimation
For each recipient i we focus on those grants, indexed by g, for which the recipient is i, i.e.
recipient(g) = i.
We define the frequency of principal recipient i receiving a rating r by frequency(i, r) and
the transition probability from rating r1 in period k to rating r2 in period k + 1 for any k by
probability(i, r1, r2) as follows:
frequency(i, r) =
∑l
k=1
∑
g:
recipient(g)=i
1{rgk=r}∑
ρ
∑l
k=1
∑
g:
recipient(g)=i
1{rgk=ρ}
probability(i, r1, r2) =
∑l−1
k=1
∑
g:
recipient(g)=i
1{rgk=r1}1{rgk+1=r2}∑
ρ
∑l−1
k=1
∑
g:
recipient(g)=i
1{rgk=r1}1{rgk+1=ρ}
Note that probability(i,Phase I, r2) = 0 for all r2 6= Phase I by definition of Phase I and Phase II.
B Model Assumptions
B.1 Qualitative Model Discussion
An important assumption of our model is that the amount of demand for medicines that may be
satisfied by a given disbursement amount (funding-to-demand ratio) is constant and deterministic.
That is, we assume that potential changes in demand and/or prices of health products potentially
affecting the demand coverage associated with given funds are predictable and accounted for in
the disbursement amounts. Although much attention and expertise is, in principle, dedicated to
determining and reviewing the grant amounts requested from the Global Fund (see §1.1), in practice
this assumption may or may not be perfectly satisfied. An important related observation, however,
is that the demand for health products that is relevant to Global Fund grants occurs at the national
8
level and therefore exhibits limited variability because it is obtained by pooling demand across
multiple geographic regions of an entire country. In addition, that demand tends to be unaffected
by sudden local epidemics (e.g., cholera, yellow fever, polio), because of limitations in the categories
of products that can be purchased with Global Fund grants as well as the time flexibility of these
grants, so that other short-term funding mechanisms are typically used instead to fight these.
We assume unlimited shelf life for the product. While this is certainly a simplification of reality,
it seems a good approximation when the funding-to-demand ratio f is relatively small and the
central warehouse in the country has an efficient procedure of shipping inventory to the peripheral
outlets. To ensure that our results are robust to the omission of shelf life, we implemented a
model where each unit of a product would expire 18 months after procurement order placement,
which we estimate to be the shortest product shelf-life in our dataset based on the information
provided by manufacturers of these health products. The resulting stockout levels are within 0.1%
of the ones with unlimited shelf-life for 90-day reporting grants and funding-to-demand ratio of
f < 2, which seems reasonable in the current environment with relatively scarce funding. The same
difference for 180-day reporting grants is 1.2%. Hence, our model underestimates stockout risks for
180-day reporting grants. However, given the large difference between stockout levels for 90- and
180-day reporting grants and the similar effect of product expiry on all 180-day reporting grants,
this extended model would not change any of the existing paper conclusions.
Furthermore, demand for health products supported by some Global Fund grant component
may in some cases span multiple medicines with possible interactions among them. In contrast,
our model considers a single product at a time. Tender-related delays, which our model ignores,
may also occur between fund disbursement and order placement. We believe that all assumptions
just mentioned lead to underestimating stockout risks. DITs and PLTs are also assumed to be
independent from the inventory level, which ignores the possibility that specific actions by Global
Fund or principal recipients when inventory levels are low (e.g., higher priority of disbursement
request, expedited transportation) could reduce them. An argument in support of this assumption
is that the Global Fund does not currently have centralized visibility of the inventory levels of
relevant health products in recipient countries, so that its ability to rationally prioritize in the short
term between different disbursement or procurement requests may be limited. Because some reliable
inventory level information may still be communicated to the Global Fund in an ad-hoc manner,
9
this assumption may still result in an over-estimation of stockout risks.
This model also implicitly assumes that countries do not have access to alternative sources of
funding when gaps in Global Fund grant disbursements occur. In principle, countries may be able to
access emergency funds through temporary reallocations between different budget lines or between
grants from different donors. In practice however, it is suggested in Kraiselburd and Yadav 2013
that these emergency fund reallocations are limited because of constraints linked to fund traceability
and transparency. In addition, in the next section we discuss some data suggesting that available
sources of funding for health programs other than Global Fund grants are often limited in many
low-income countries.
B.2 Single Funding Source
In order to provide some context for the limitation of our model scope to funding obtained from
Global Fund grants, we discuss below the available data on donor funding sources for each of the
three diseases. Figure B1 provides a graph of the proportion of donor funding from the Global Fund
by country and disease. For each disease, the specific data provided is as follows:
HIV/AIDS
The Global Fund has been the single largest donor in 2009-2011 for 30 countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Within those 30 countries, the Global Fund’s support as a fraction of total donor funding
ranges between 37% in Lesotho and 94% in Gambia.
Malaria
We used data from the World Malaria Report (WHO 2011). The Global Fund accounts for ap-
proximately 50% of international financing of malaria control. In Sub-Saharan Africa the number
is slightly higher at 57% (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). For the three African
countries in the World Malaria Report (Ghana, Madagascar and Nigeria), government malaria ex-
penditure per person at risk is at least four times lower than by the GF. Furthermore, around 55%
of GF funding is used for insecticide-treated nets and animalarial treatment against only 15% of
government expenditure on health products. Hence, we conclude that about half of funding for
malaria-related procurement in Africa is from the GF, meaning that the Global Fund is the pre-
dominant financier of procurement in a number of African countries.
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Figure B1: Proportion of donor funding from Global Fund by disease
Notes: Data source – The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (Kaiser 2012). See text for discussion on each disease
data.
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Tuberculosis
African governments account for 30% of their TB budgets and the GF is the primary donor
financing TB programs(Figure B1). Hence, we conclude that the Global Fund is responsible for the
procurement of most of TB-related drugs in Africa.
B.3 Model Validation Support
Despite the widely reported prevalence of national stockouts for essential medicines in Africa (see
references cited in §1), we are not aware of any readily available dataset systematically documenting
the historical national stockout episodes of any African country, let alone for all of Africa. Because
of the public health impact of stockouts, this data is associated with management performance and
political accountability, which makes it very sensitive and confidential.
Table 2 shows average simulated in-sample implementation lengths obtained with baseline pa-
rameters, against average actual in-sample and out-of-sample implementation lengths, and Figure
B2 plots the hit fraction of out-of-sample observations of grant implementation lengths relative to
the in-sample simulation distribution; both are discussed in §3.3.
Figure B2: Hit fractions of out-of-sample observations of grant implementation lengths
relative to in-sample simulated distribution.
Notes: Hit percentages - fraction of out-of-sample observations - below θ quantile of the corresponding predicted
implementation length distribution for θ between 0.25 and 0.95 in increments of 0.1; 90% acceptance region for the
null hypothesis that out-of-sample observations were realizations from the corresponding distributional forecasts of
the simulation.
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C Additional Model Results
C.1 Causal Impact of Grant Monitoring Frequency
The results in §4.1 show that the estimated stockouts of all 90-day grants are substantially higher
than the estimated stockouts of all 180-day grants. If these stockout risks were driven by underlying
recipient risk factors as opposed to the reporting mechanism, this would imply that the Global Fund
would have correctly assessed these risk factors in advance when determining the appropriate grant
monitoring frequency for all 641 grants of our data set, a seemingly implausible scenario. In addition,
there are 26 grants in our dataset for which the Global Fund decided to change the reporting
frequency at some point during their implementation (15 grants switched from 90-day to 180-day,
11 grants from 180-day to 90-day). Such changes were likely deliberate and carefully thought out,
as the remaining 435 grants kept the same reporting frequency throughout. These 26 grants thus
provide an opportunity to consider modified paired counterfactual grants providing an indication of
what would have happened if different performance monitoring mechanisms had been used, holding
the underlying implementation risks constant. To that end, we simulated the corresponding 26
associated virtual grants with the exact same ratings history over time as their paired originals,
but with symmetrically opposed reporting frequencies in each time period: each single reporting
period of 180 days was replaced by two consecutive reporting periods of 90 days and each pair of
consecutive 90 day periods was replaced with a single reporting period of 180 days. While our
conclusions are limited by sample size, we observe that the mean difference between the simulated
implementation lengths of the counterfactual and original grants is statistically higher (with 91.9%
significance level) than the mean difference between the simulated lengths of the original grants
and the corresponding actual implementation lengths. Hence, at 90% significance we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the grant implementation lengths are driven by the performance monitoring
mechanism itself rather than any underlying risk factors associated with each recipient.
C.2 Effect of Health Product Type on Stockouts
The results shown in Table C1 suggest that stockout differences among countries in the same African
regions and between landlocked and non-landlocked countries are limited. While grant rating and
countries’ geographic type are important predictors of DIT and PLT, respectively, they do not affect
stockout risks significantly. In North Africa and West & Central Africa, expected lost demand did
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not vary significantly across health product types. However, anti-TB drugs experience significantly
higher stockouts only in landlocked countries in the regions of East and South Africa. This is the
result of longer PLTs for those countries, which combined with DITs lead to higher stockouts. Hence,
the question here is why procurement lead time for anti-TB drugs is higher in those countries?
This is not specifically due to the geographic region or landlock situation, as this effect is not
observed for landlocked countries in North and West Africa. Rather, conversations with current and
former Global Fund staff point out to a specific supplier practice consisting of pooling orders from
these countries. This could indeed lead to longer PLTs since the supplier might wait for more orders
before processing and distributing the one(s) already received. This explanation is also supported
by some additional analysis of the procurement data showing that the 10 countries with substantial
higher stockouts for anti-TB products are 38% more likely to share drug suppliers than any other
countries. These 10 countries are also 72% more likely to share suppliers among themselves than
with another country.
C.3 Yearly Replenishment
As a robustness check, we also performed the simulation with yearly procurement instead of every
period, that is procurement every two periods for 180-day reporting grants and every four periods
for 90-day reporting grants (Table C2).
Table C2: Expected stockouts by African region under yearly replenishment (percentages)
Yearly Replenishment Policy
Phase I Phase II IR BF SF
Reporting Frequency (days) 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180
African
Region
North 22.6% 1.0% 20.8% 3.1% 16.2% 0.7% 19.5% 3.0% 9.9% 1.06%
East 46.1% 5.2% 35.2% 8.4% 29.3 % 2.9% 35.0% 7.7% 22.7% 2.78%
South 22.2% 2.1% 20.3% 3.0% 14.8% 1.0% 18.2% 2.8% 7.1% 0.86%
West & Central 18.5% 1.7% 17.1% 2.2% 12.0% 0.4% 15.6% 2.0% 4.4% 1.15%
Notes: Expected stockouts for the proposed base case interventions by African region over a three-year time horizon:
180-day sufficiency of initial inventory and cash buffer level of 10%; results based on 5,000 replications ensuring the
length of the 95% confidence interval is less than 1% of the estimated expected stockout in each scenario.
The interpretation of the per period cash buffer level is unchanged, so that the yearly replenish-
ment buffer was twice as large as the period one buffer for 180-day reporting grants and four times as
large for 90-day reporting grants. For 90-day reporting grants, stockouts with yearly replenishment
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were smaller compared with the corresponding per period replenishment: 5–10pp for the Phase I
and Phase II scenarios; 4–6pp for IR; 1–3pp for BF and 2–5pp for SF. Yearly replenishment did not
lead to a statistically significant reduction of expected stockouts for 180-day reporting grants.
C.4 Probability of Stockout Over Time
Table C3 provides the implied probability of a stockout (percentage) over three years. Strikingly,
programs with 90-day reporting grants had on average at least 50% chance of a stockout in all
regions, with the probability raising to 98.6% in East Africa.
Table C3: Probability of a stockout occurrence over three years (percentage)
Policy
Phase I Phase II IR BF SF
Reporting Frequency (days) 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180 90 180
African
Region
North 68.8% 10.2% 68.7% 19.7% 56.7% 6.9% 64.2% 14.4% 42.1% 9.7%
East 98.6% 26.1% 76.6% 35.3% 71.5% 19.3% 74.1% 31.9% 65.3% 19.1%
South 68.5% 14.9% 59.7% 19.5% 52.6% 9.9% 56.6% 13.9% 37.4% 7.6%
West & Central 57.2% 14.3% 50.4% 15.1% 41.8% 6.1% 45.3% 12.1% 31.5 % 7.5%
Notes: Percentage of 5,000 replications in which stockout over three years was positive; results across different drugs
and within African region weighted by the number of reported malaria cases in 2010 for anti-malaria and malaria
prevention drugs; sum of people in need of and on ARV treatment for ARV drugs; number of people living with AIDS
for HIV prevention drugs; new TB cases in 2011 for anti-TB drugs (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2012).
Plotting the probability of stockout on a particular day in Figure C1, the probability of stockout
achieves a local minimum at times which are multiples of the period length following the exhaustion
of initial inventory. The intuition for 90-day reporting grant is as follows: since initial inventory
suffices for 180 days, no stockout before that time occurs; stockout between day 180 and 270 occurs
if any only if no procurement order has been received; this probability decreases over time and thus
so does the probability of stockout; the sharp increase on day 271 stems from the fact that stockout
no longer occurs if and only if no procurement order has been received, but it could also occur if a
procurement order has been received before day 180 so that it was used to satisfy demand between
day 180 and 270; as long as no second order has been received, stockout at day 271 occurs. The
interpretation of these results for 180-day grants is similar.
16
Figure C1: Probability of stockout for 53 African countries over time
Notes: Simulated probability of stockout aggregated over 53 African countries over a three-year time horizon. Proba-
bility of stockout in Africa, weighted sum of fraction of 5,000 scenarios in which inventory was zero; results for African
region weighted by estimated proportional demand; initial inventory sufficient for 6 months; cash buffer level of 10%
for all scenarios except synchronized financing where it is 50% by definition ; scenarios are Phase II (baseline), Phase
I, IR - instantaneous replenishment, BF - bridge financing and SF - synchronized financing.
C.5 Initial Inventory
Figure C2 shows the effect of initial inventory on the expected fraction of lost demand over three
years for all policy scenarios.
Figure C2: Effect of initial inventory on lost demand
Notes: Effect of initial inventory on simulated average proportion of lost demand aggregated over 53 African countries
over a three-year time horizon. Aggregate expected stockout in fraction of lost demand in Africa with results for each
African region weighted by estimated proportional demand; time horizon is three years; 0% cash buffer level for all
scenarios except synchronized financing where it is 50% by definition; scenarios are Phase II (baseline), Phase I, IR
- instantaneous replenishment, BF - bridge financing and SF - synchronized financing.
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D Additional Data Analysis
D.1 Cumulative Probability Distributions
Figures C3 and C4 provide the cumulative distributions of procurement lead time and disbursement
inter-arrival time, respectively, by African region. The lower cumulative distributions in East Africa
in all instances exemplify the qualitative results discussed in §4.2.
Figure C3: Cumulative probability distribution of procurement lead time distribution
Notes: Estimated cumulative probability distribution of procurement lead-time distribution. Fraction of PLT obser-
vations in each African region not exceeding a fixed number of days.
Figure C4: Cumulative probability distribution of disbursement inter-arrival times
Notes: Estimated cumulative probability distribution of disbursement inter-arrival times in relation to cash buffer
level. Fraction of DIT observations in each African region not exceeding the sufficiency of the per period disbursement,
defined as period length plus cash buffer level.
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D.2 Grant Reporting Frequency
We estimated some additional regression models to further investigate the drivers of grant reporting
frequency. All specifications indicate that the grant phase is the most useful predictor of reporting
frequency: grants in Phase II are around 30% more likely to have 180-day reporting frequency than
grants in Phase I. We also included three variables related to the trust between the Global Fund
and the PR: the number of past PR grant ratings of a certain kind, the number of years since the
Global Fund first disbursed to the PR and the number of approved PR grants. All of these are
historical data up to the reporting frequency observation, e.g. for a reporting frequency observed
in March 2012 we count the relevant past disbursements and grants up to March 2012.
Each grant approved by the Global Fund increases the probability of 180-day reporting frequency
of future grants by around 8% (statistically significant at the 95% level). There is also a positive
correlation between past PR performance and reporting frequency: specification (3) shows a larger
number of past A ratings increases the probability of 180-day reporting frequency, while past C
ratings decreases it. Looking at the time of collaboration alone, the number of years since first
disbursement, we do not observe a significant effect on reporting frequency.
Our analysis shows that there is a correlation between trust and longer reporting frequency
and this trust is based on past performance (ratings, grant approvals) rather than duration of the
collaboration. In specification (5), we also control for the grant disbursement amount and the PR
country corruption perception index.
The Global Fund classifies its principal recipients into Government (Ministry of Health or others),
Multinational Organizations (e.g. UNDP, the Red Cross) and NGOs (local organizations, such as
Mission East). Regression specifications (2)-(5) show strong correlation between PR type and grant
reporting frequency: multinational organizations tend to have longer reporting frequencies than
government and NGOs tend to have shorter.
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Reporting frequency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline: 90-day
Grant Phase
Baseline: Phase I
Phase II 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.28
(0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)***
PR Type
Baseline: Government
Multinational Organization 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.07
(0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)** (0.03)**
NGO -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
(0.04)** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)***
Number of past PR ratings:
A 0.05
(0.014)*
B1 0.01
(0.02)
B2 -0.04
(0.03)
C -0.14
(0.04)***
Years since first disbursement to PR 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.05)
Number of approved PR grants 0.08 0.09
(0.03)** (0.04)**
Disbursement Amount (Million USD) -0.03 -0.03
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
PR Country Corruption Index 0.02 0.03
(0.007)*** (0.005)***
Observations 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658
R-squared 0.083 0.091 0.105 0.098 0.094
Notes: Multiple regressions of reporting frequency on grant phase, PR type, past PR ratings, years since first disburse-
ment to PR, number of approved PR grants, grant disbursement amount (million USD) and PR country corruption
perception index by Transparency International. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
D.3 Corruption
Higher corruption perception index (higher values suggest less corruption) is associated with shorter
DITs for 90-day grants, but the effect is not significant for 180-day reporting grant. This observation
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can be used by the Global Fund to better understand the association between country characteristics
and expected stockouts.
DIT 90-day 180-day
Controls
Phase Indicator
Grant Rating
African region
Linear Monthly Trend
GF Disease
Corruption Perception Index -6.73 -4.35
(0 to 100) (1.82)*** (2.43)
Observations 814 844
R-squared 0.105 0.070
Notes: Multiple regressions of DIT on corruption perception index by Transparency International controlling for all
variables from Table A3. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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